Mechanisms in the source
- Ed25519 NodeIdentity and signed protocol/control artifacts.
- X25519 ephemeral key agreement and HKDF-SHA256 session key derivation in DVeProto v2.
- AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD frames, transcript Finished authentication, and sequence/replay checks.
- DVeMesh signed configuration snapshots, enrollment proof-of-possession, peer identity confirmation, and Unix IPC peer-credential checks.
- Network topology authorization is separate from IPv4 packet ACL. ACL defaults to DENY.
Important identity limit
The generic DVeProto handshake authenticates the server's Ed25519 NodeID to a client, but a ClientHello's claimed client NodeID is not a signature proving possession of the corresponding key. DVeVPN adds an application-level client proof. DVeMesh adds its own signed peer identity confirmation. Do not generalize one consumer's admission checks to all consumers.
Local security
MeshDaemon IPC is a local Unix socket with bounded JSON messages and Linux peer credentials; the exposed operations are read-only. The managed daemon owns the dataplane. The Installer preserves existing identity during normal repair/reinstall paths and handles enrollment credentials separately from persistent state.
Artifact trust
Bootstrap verifies an externally provisioned Ed25519 trust anchor against a canonical signed manifest and validates each wheel's size and SHA-256 before pip. A checksum from the same HTTPS origin is not an independent trust proof. Public artifact distribution and external trust-anchor delivery remain pending.
Not certified
No independent full-project security audit, production security certification, public uptime, or external release validation is claimed. Review Trust Model, Identity, and the source-level security notes before deployment decisions.